Intuituitive Cooperation and Habits of Virtue

Organizational Behavior Seminar

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 

April 2, 2014, 12 p.m. - 1:15 p.m.


Cooperation on Social Networks

Invited Symposium, Association for Psychological Science 

Berkeley CA, May 23, 2014

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Past Events

Habits of Virtue and Norms of Prosociality

UCF Behavioral Ethics Workshop, University of Central Florida

Orlando, FL, Feb 28, 2014


Strategies Used in Noisy Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Economics Micro Theory Lunch

Yale University, New Haven, CT

March 4, 2014, 12 p.m. - 1 p.m.


Intuitive Cooperation and Habits of Virtue

NIH Intramural Research Program

Bethesda, MD, Jan 24, 2014


Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed: the Automatic Psychology of Cooperation

Psychology Colloquium, Smith College

Northampton, MA, Feb 6, 2014


Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory (Session E)

Society for Personality and Social Psychology (Symposium E-9)

Austin, TX, Feb 15, 2014

Why do we often cooperate with strangers, and why do cooperation rates differ across cultures? An answer comes from the Social Heuristics Hypothesis: people automatize strategies that are successful in daily social interaction. If people primarily interact in environments where cooperation is advantageous (due to effective "rules of the game"), they adopt cooperation as their default behavior more generally. Here we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic motivations to cooperate in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial with strangers, more likely to punish selfishness, and more generally trusting. Furthermore, we show that this effect is driven by subjects who use heuristics. Our findings provide direct evidence that strategies from repeated interactions spill over into one-shot settings, and shed light on the origins of cooperative intuitions.